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It is now ten years since the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) was concluded, subsuming that 
seemingly comprehensive intellectual property treaty into the 
institutional apparatus of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  For 
many observers, TRIPs and the WTO established the framework of a 
new international intellectual property system.  They were the center of 
the new system, into which other institutional components would feed, 
and from which other institutions would draw their agenda.  The norms 
that TRIPs and the WTO articulated would inform all aspects of 
international intellectual property lawmaking.  Indeed, around that 
time, a group of scholars published a collection of essays under the title 
GATT or WIPO?, contemplating the extent to which the WTO would 
displace the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) as the 
dominant institution of international intellectual property law. 
Ten years on, the answer to that question is neither the WTO, nor 
WIPO.  It is the WTO 
and WIPO; 
and the practices of multinational information industry actors; 
and technology that operates without regard to territory; 
and national courts developing for the first time a private 
international law of intellectual property; 
and new actors whose authority and remit are not linked to any 
particular nation-state; 
and transnational networks of nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs); 
and existing international institutions that now find their work 
 
* Professor of Law, Associate Dean, and Director of the Program in Intellectual Property 
Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Professor of Intellectual Property Law, Queen Mary 
College, University of London.  This Lecture is a revised version of a lecture that was 
previously published in 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 213 (2004).  It was also presented at the 
“The First Ten Years of the TRIPs Agreement” conference at Marquette University Law 
School in April 2005. 
DINWOODIE - FORMATTED 3/3/2006  12:21:21 PM 
206 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:2 
 
impacted by intellectual property law. 
The international intellectual property system has become a network 
of numerous institutions with many new actors, establishing and 
operating under new structures, and generating a welter of new norms.  
This is a much less convenient, much messier picture than the narrative 
of TRIPs as the central framework.  But it is a fuller picture of the 
system by which intellectual property norms are generated and 
implemented internationally. 
There is a danger that the elevation of TRIPs to the focal point of 
the system might create a myopia, distracting scholars and policymakers 
from attending fully to institutions and actors that are contributing to 
the internationalization of intellectual property law with as much (if not 
more) effect than TRIPs and the WTO.  The internationalization of law 
comes about through many devices other than international law.  It is 
therefore important that we adopt a broader vision of the international 
intellectual property system. 
Of course, TRIPs has been and remains a vital component of the 
new international intellectual property system.  Its adoption generated 
institutional competition with WIPO and gave birth to a useful range of 
alternative lawmaking devices.  The enhanced protection that TRIPs 
ensured on a broader geographic scale raised the visibility of intellectual 
property rights and drew a broader range of actors into the public 
debate and the lawmaking process. 
But TRIPs is only one component.  In the first part of this lecture, I 
will highlight a few of the system’s new institutions and lawmaking 
dynamics.  Then I will suggest how we might reorient debates about the 
international intellectual property system in ways that allow us to strike 
a balance that many commentators feel is now lacking. 
To begin with, however, in assessing the system, it is important to 
note that international intellectual property policymakers are engaged 
in an attempt simultaneously to strike two different balances.  One 
balance, which likewise drives domestic intellectual property law, is that 
between private rights sufficient to incentivize creative behavior and 
third-party access to the fruits of that creativity so as to maximize its 
social value.  But the incentives likely to maximize the production and 
dissemination of knowledge may vary from country to country, and thus 
international intellectual property law must attend to a second balance, 
one that occupies the attention of international law generally, and that is 
the balance between universal norms and the national autonomy 
necessary to legislate a substantive balance appropriate to each nation-
state. 
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With that metric in mind, let me briefly provide some examples of 
the new institutions I mentioned. 
1)  The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) 
adopted by the Internet Corportation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN) in 1999 is perhaps the most notable example of 
private ordering that has mitigated the jurisdictional difficulties 
presented by the ubiquity of the Internet.  The UDRP has become the 
international standard for resolving cybersquatting disputes. 
Although ICANN’s authority derives from an agreement with the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, it operates largely without reference to 
the laws of any particular nation.  The UDRP shows that private actors, 
and actors that cannot be described using the traditional labels of 
“national,” “international” or “supranational,” may create 
“international intellectual property law” with virtually as much ease 
(and certainly as much effect) as nation-states. 
Results in UDRP proceedings can, however, be overcome by 
contrary determinations in national courts.  The UDRP is soft law.  Yet 
in practice, “appeals” to national courts have rarely been invoked, and 
thus the UDRP has proven to be much harder law than theory would 
suggest. 
2)  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (DMCA) immunizes 
an Internet service provider (ISP) from damages for copyright 
infringement where it hosts a subscriber’s web site containing infringing 
material, provided that once the ISP receives a notice from a copyright 
owner reporting an alleged infringement, it expeditiously removes the 
infringing material. 
Under the DMCA, ISPs have through their responses to such 
notices effectively served as first-instance adjudicators of disputes 
between copyright owners and users who post copyrighted content to 
websites.  The practices of ISPs clearly have the capacity to support 
norms with respect to both the scope and enforcement of copyright. 
Indeed, ISP practices under the DMCA are coming to establish 
international norms.  U.S. copyright owners are serving notices on ISPs 
worldwide and receiving surprisingly high levels of compliance.  
Typically, extrusion of a country’s law occurs through its application by 
courts, nominally restrained by private international law, a context that 
is both transparent and subject to contest by courts of other countries.  
These checks are lacking in the DMCA context. 
Moreover, ISP practices may shift the balance between the 
application of national and international rules.  Every aspect of the 
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international regime implicitly allocates prescriptive authority.  Where 
this balance is adjusted via ISP practices, however, the allocation might 
be the product of serendipitous forces largely related to the governance 
and client bases of multi-national ISPs rather than any publicly debated 
policy value. 
3)  Copyright owners increasingly use technological measures to 
protect their works against unauthorized acts, and international law 
imposes no limits on the type of measure owners can use.  Like ISP 
practices, technology need not be territorially configured.  Copyright 
owners may deploy protection measures that are tied to international 
rather than national norms.  Alternatively, technological measures have 
the capability to reterritorialize international knowledge markets and 
implement national norms, and they can set norms without reference to 
either national or international norms.  Private ordering thus can affect 
the structural norms of international copyright law:  According to which 
set of values will the decision whether to universalize or territorialize be 
made?  Again, we do not know, because this private ordering is subject 
to little or no scrutiny at any level, and certainly none at the 
international level. 
Let me turn now to some of the ways existing institutions have 
revised their lawmaking operations.  WIPO continues to be a primary 
institutional component of the new system, but it has reinvented itself.  
In addition to its traditional functions, WIPO has built relationships 
with many new actors.  For example, it has signed a cooperation 
agreement with the WTO, facilitating the incorporation of WIPO-
created norms into the WTO process.  Indeed, the WTO panel report in 
United States—Section 110(5) encouraged continuing integration by 
favoring the interpretation of TRIPs consistent with norms in the 
broader network of copyright treaties.  This principle gives WIPO an 
ever-open entry point into the WTO system. 
Similarly, the UDRP adopted by ICANN was drafted by WIPO, and 
WIPO’s Arbitration Center is the primary administrator of the 
proceedings through which claims under it are resolved.  Moreover, 
WIPO continues to be a leading forum for development of the UDRP, 
shaping the direction of those international standards in ways that 
ICANN’s own internal review committee has been unable to achieve. 
Finally, WIPO has recognized the changed nature of current 
demands for internationalization (made primarily by right holders): 
(1)  International solutions are now being sought more quickly.  
Some recent international instruments have articulated rather than 
codified norms, perhaps reflecting a fear that national practices may 
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give rise to norms that would be hard to compromise internationally at a 
later date. 
(2)  The call for early international intervention has been 
accompanied by difficulty in achieving consensus among the more 
numerous and diverse members of the new system, especially without 
the possibility of non-intellectual property side payments that facilitated 
TRIPs. 
Thus WIPO restructured itself institutionally to generate more soft 
law, such as non-binding recommendations adopted by its Standing 
Committee on Trademarks.  These recommendations are accepted 
more speedily and provoke less entrenchment on the part of national 
delegations. 
This soft law is hardened in many ways, but few of these involve the 
WTO.  For example, the hardening of the UDRP arguably stems from 
its functional advantages to trademark owners.  And standing 
committee resolutions have found their way into TRIPs-plus bilateral 
agreements, opinions of national jurists, and proposals for formal WIPO 
treaties, such as the proposed Revised Trademark Law Treaty. 
Soft law is thus an important component of the new system, 
although its significance (and hardening) often depends upon 
interactions with parts of the system other than the WTO. 
Trade arrangements remain important, however.  As multilateral 
ministerial discussions have stalled, leading developed countries have 
pursued bilaterally harmonization agendas that cannot be achieved 
multilaterally.  These bilateral agreements typically impose TRIPs-plus 
standards.  They have therefore attracted the ire of critics who take 
issue with the substantive intellectual property balance that they 
embody, especially when imposed upon developing countries, whose 
immediate need for lesser protection is reflected in the continuing grace 
periods that permit delays in full implementation of the bare TRIPs 
standards. 
Gains secured in a series of bilateral arrangements have commonly 
been consolidated through the multilateral device, and the United 
States has acknowledged this dynamic in explaining its bilateral strategy.  
Yet the introduction of most-favored nation obligations into 
international intellectual property law by the TRIPs Agreement may 
increase the momentum to move to the multilateral level.  
Problematically, too, a lack of transparency often attends bilateral 
negotiations. 
Although bilateral agreements are not new, it is when they work in 
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tandem with other institutional devices that the role of the bilateral in 
the new system becomes significant.  Thus, bilaterals have become a 
means by which the United States seeks to harden the nonbinding 
resolutions of the WIPO Standing Committee on Trademarks regarding 
the protection of well-known marks.  It is through bilateral negotiations 
that the United States is persuading countries to use the UDRP as a 
model for resolution of cybersquatting disputes in their country-code 
domain.  Finally, bilaterals might break down the coalition of twenty 
developing countries that has blocked the U.S. multilateral agenda. 
Indeed, a review of bilateral activity highlights a broader point:  
Even in the trade context, the shape of international intellectual 
property law is being determined by the interaction of numerous 
components of the system. 
In addition to bilateralism, we must be alert to unilateralism.  There 
should be no trade unilateralism after TRIPs, but here I want to use the 
term as an introduction to the increasingly important activities of 
national courts.  Ten years ago, one could barely detect a private 
international law of intellectual property, either in the courts or in the 
literature. 
In the classical system, national courts had very little role to play in 
the construction of international intellectual property law.  Litigation 
involved national rights; courts were reluctant even to adjudicate claims 
involving foreign intellectual property rights, prompting serial national 
litigation of multinational disputes. 
National courts are, however, beginning to tackle multinational 
cases and thus to contribute to the effective creation of international 
norms.  This has occurred most perceptibly in the copyright context in 
the United States, where courts will now hear claims under foreign laws, 
provide multinational relief, and effectively regulate globally by 
localizing any Internet conduct in the United States. 
These trends are less evident in patent cases, but U.S. courts have 
become less restrained in applying the Lanham Act extraterrorially.  
The enactment of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act in 
1999 has prompted even more intrusive U.S. judicial regulation of 
domain name space. Thus, private law developments in national courts 
increasingly generate the content of international intellectual property 
law. 
How do we bring coherence to this dispersed, decentralized system?  
One might view this array of new actors, sources and institutions as 
intervening data points, all designed to feed back to a central institution, 
whether the WTO or WIPO. 
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I resist this impulse.  Such a dispersed system may possess 
advantages over the classical model.  For example, national court 
development of “international law,” like technological measures and 
ISP practices, can (if properly transparent and monitored) be more 
responsive to social conditions and hence more dynamic than the treaty 
process.  Moreover, such lawmaking would not result in the premature 
entrenchment of a higher norm of international law in the way that 
WTO dispute settlement body rulings in practice might do.  It is more 
readily subject to control by national political institutions.  Moreover, 
this means of developing international intellectual property law is less 
subject to the political demands that historically have burdened the 
treaty process and that continue to limit its efficacy.  Finally, such a 
mélange of national and international norms conforms to the 
decentralized yet interconnected structure of global society. 
I also resist the effort to feed these developments back toward the 
multilateral treaty system, because it is inevitable that the non-treaty-
based system will effect internationalization more efficiently than the 
further development of TRIPs. 
The interests at stake are now so varied, the reach of intellectual 
property law so wide, the demands of internationalization so strong, that 
it is hard to envisage an ambitious treaty on substantive norms that can 
obtain broad approval.  In light of those same factors, plus burgeoning 
technological capacity and a proliferation of transnational actors 
(whether corporations, users, or NGOs), it is hard to see how a non-
treaty system can be stopped. 
The WTO will not, of course, recede into the darkness.  So what is 
its role?  Rochelle Dreyfuss and I have argued that dispute settlement 
panels must follow interpretive principles of neofederalism that 
preserve the autonomy of member states to adopt approaches tailored 
to their own circumstances.  The formalism that TRIPs panels have 
exhibited thus far might, we fear, be used to limit autonomy and expand 
international obligations at a time when an impasse has been reached 
among negotiators of TRIPs II. 
In the Ministerial context, Ruth Okediji has focused on the factors 
that affect coalition-building by developing countries to redress 
imbalances among states occasioned by power asymmetries and weak 
domestic institutions.  Larry Helfer has explained how developing 
countries have engaged in regime-shifting to generate alternative 
substantive norms.  Jerry Reichman and Keith Maskus propose a 
moratorium.  The time has come, they say, “to take intellectual property 
off the international lawmaking agenda.”  Each of these proposals 
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reflects a concern that the process toward universal standards is moving 
more quickly, and more definitively, than is advisable. 
I am reluctant “to take intellectual property off the international 
lawmaking agenda.”  To be sure, under the classical model, multilateral 
agreements were built upon an evolving consensus.  But the tide is 
running more strongly toward global solutions; for reasons of principle 
and pragmatism, we must react differently. 
As a matter of principle, although internationalization may be 
occurring more quickly, and sometimes without the transparency or 
participation that is ideal, the exigencies of global trade and digital 
technologies require recalibration of the balance between national and 
international norms.  To debate what that balance should be, we need 
information and institutional structures that allow choices to be made 
fairly and consciously.  That is why the process of international 
intellectual property lawmaking should be a primary focus of attention. 
Pragmatically, one cannot take intellectual property off the 
international lawmaking table because so much internationalization is 
taking place underneath the table.  Reichman and Maskus hope that a 
moratorium would preserve the status quo and the autonomy with 
which nation-states are invested.  Instead, it may simply defer to the 
different lawmaking institutions and actors already discussed.  
International lawmaking is necessary to ensure that these new processes 
occur transparently and in ways likely to produce the optimal balance 
that Reichman and Maskus seek to preserve.  In short, there must still 
be a positive international intellectual property agenda. 
What should that agenda be? 
First, scholars and policymakers must recognize the inevitable and 
potentially useful ability of private actors, nonstate actors, technology, 
multinational corporations, and national courts to effect the 
internationalization of intellectual property norms. 
Second, to ensure that these norms are developed with the same 
respect for voice and legitimacy that guided the development of the 
classical treaty-based system, attention must be paid to question of 
process, transparency, and representation.  Transparency of private 
practices is essential if active national lawmaking is to act as a constraint 
on private ordering.  What I have called “the public structuring” of 
private ordering becomes key.  Rules must address the structural 
incentives for developing norms in one direction or another.  And there 
must be a public allocation of certain issues to the national or the 
international realm.  These questions are beginning to be addressed in 
scattered national, regional, and international instruments, but they 
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must be given greater significance. 
Third, in this decentralized system, the interaction between 
components may represent an important source of law.  That interaction 
will help construct the balance between the national and the universal.  
For example, should national courts defer to UDRP panel opinions, or 
to other national courts addressing multinational disputes?  Should they 
pay heed to the public international backdrop (whether in treaties or 
soft law) in interpreting the content and scope of national law? 
In the context of national judicial relations, ongoing discussions may 
shape the answer to these questions.  The Hague Conference on Private 
International Law continues to work on a jurisdiction and judgments 
convention that, although narrower than the treaty contemplated four 
years ago, would greatly enhance the role of national courts in the 
intellectual property system.  Likewise, the American Law Institute 
(ALI) last year commenced a project to formulate soft law principles to 
guide courts in resolving international intellectual property disputes. 
These specific examples highlight two conceptual points of focus for 
the international intellectual property system. 
First, in an era in which substantive issues are often too contested to 
conclude treaties, but in which technology and global trade will force 
and facilitate international solutions, the focus of the international 
intellectual property law system has to be in large part on institutional 
design.  The Hague and ALI projects would establish the basic 
conditions under which national courts could contribute to and develop 
a form of international intellectual property law.  The international 
system has to create an environment in which that lawmaking is fair and 
balanced.  That is, the process and structure of lawmaking must be 
addressed.  This is true of the ways in which national courts contribute, 
but it is true also of how private actors contribute, how soft law 
contributes, how governmental and NGO networks contribute, and how 
intergovernmental organizations contribute. 
Second, increasingly international intellectual property has to focus 
on constraints or checks on lawmaking.  As Ruth Okediji has stressed, 
this is the classical role of international law, but I would emphasize that 
the constraints in question must address checks on more than simply 
national legislative activity. 
Thus, the Hague Convention would empower national courts to do 
what they might in any event do unilaterally, but it would also constrain 
them, requiring them to articulate the reasons for their involvement in 
the international intellectual property system.  Consolidation 
obligations (or even opportunities) in such a treaty might also operate 
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as a constraint on multinational corporations exploiting the legal fiction 
of territoriality to secure strategic gains in multinational litigation. 
In the context of private actors, international obligations of 
transparency and public structuring of the environment in which private 
ordering occurs might act as a constraint on the effective lawmaking of 
private actors. 
National courts, themselves subject to constraints imposed by way of 
a jurisdiction convention, might be important checks on ICANN/UDRP 
panels pushing the mandate of anti-cybersquatting authority too 
aggressively in the face of legitimate national interests.  (In fact, this 
dual role of national courts merely illustrates that the system will 
ultimately rely on different components checking each other). 
Finally, international treaties might contain what I have called 
“substantive maxima” (what others have called “users’ rights,” and what 
might also be called “mandatory limits and exceptions”) that would 
constrain national legislatures.  Ideally, they would do so in ways akin to 
the role played by substantive minima in a century in which lack of any 
protection was a pre-dominant concern. 
Thus designed, and thus constrained, this array of lawmaking 
institutions presents opportunities for reconfiguring the international 
intellectual property system in ways that strike the balance the system 
has always sought to promote, but in ways that reflect the more global 
nature of modern life. 
 
